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THE ABSORPTION LAW
OR
HOW TO KREISEL A HILBERT-BERNAYS-LO¨B
ALBERT VISSER
Abstract. In this paper, we show how to construct for a given consistent
theory U a Σ0
1
-predicate that both satisfies the Lo¨b Conditions and the Kreisel
Condition —even if U is unsound. We do this in such a way that U itself can
verify satisfaction of an internal version of the Kreisel Condition.
1. Introduction
When does a predicate P in a theory U count as a provability predicate for
U? There are various ideas on the market to explicate this notion. These ideas
provide conditions for being a provability predicate that cater to various intuitions.1
In the present paper, three classes of conditions will be considered: the Hilbert-
Bernays-Lo¨b Conditions, the Kreisel Condition and the Feferman Condition. We
will introduce the various conditions with some care in Section 3. In the present
paper, we will not go into the philosophical discussion about the meaning of the
conditions and their relative pro’s and con’s. However, in Appendix A, we will
give examples that illustrate that all three classes of conditions are independent of
one another. These examples can help the reader to form her own impression of
what the conditions involve and, possibly, help her to get more grip on the issues
surrounding the choice between the various classes of conditions.
The aim of our paper is to study the interplay of the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b Condi-
tions and the Kreisel Condition for the case of Σ01-predicates. The Kreisel condition
for a provability predicate △ for a theory U demands that U ⊢ △A iff U ⊢ A. A first
question is whether we can have the Kreisel Condition for a predicate that satisfies
the Lo¨b Conditions in case our theory U is unsound. A second question is as follows.
If △ satisfies the Lo¨b Conditions, the theory U , when consistent, cannot verify both
the Kreisel Condition and the internal Kreisel Condition △△A ↔ △A. However,
can we have the next best thing, to wit: given an appropriately good provability
predicate 2 for U , can we find a predicate △, that satisfies the Lo¨b Conditions and
for which we have both U ⊢ △A iff U ⊢ A, and U ⊢ 2△A ↔ 2A? As we will see
the answer to the last question is yes. We can find, in many cases, a predicate △
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that satisfies the Lo¨b Conditions, the Kreisel Condition and the internal Kreisel
Condition U ⊢ 2△A↔ 2A.
We develop a general construction of a Σ01-predicate △ that satisfies both the
Lo¨b Conditions and the external and internal Kreisel Conditions from suitable data.
The internal Kreisel principle ⊢ 2△A ↔ 2A splits in two sub-principles, to wit,
the absorption law ⊢ 2△A → 2A and the emission law ⊢ 2A → 2△A. Our main
focus will be on the absorption law.
1.1. Historical Note. The following fact is due to Orey. Suppose U is an extension
of PA. Then, we can find an elementary α such that α represents the axiom set of
U over PA and U 0 2α⊥. See [Fef60]. See also [Lin03, Chapter 2].
A construction of a Fefermanian predicate with Σ01-axiomatization α for a theory
U that extends PA, such that none of the iterated 2α-inconsistency statements 2
n
α⊥
is provable in U is given in [Bek90]. See also [Kur17].
Clearly our result extends the results of Orey and Beklemishev.
The predicates constructed in the present paper can be viewed as slow provability
predicates. The absorption law holds for slow provability predicates over PA. Slow
provability over EA was introduced and studied in [Vis12]. Slow provability over
PA was introduced and studied in [FRW13]. This notion was further studied in
[HP16], [Fre17], [FP17] and [RatXX].
The disadvantage of the present approach to slow provability is that the con-
nection to proof theory and ordinal analysis is not visible. The advantage of the
present approach to slow provability compared to the one of [FRW13] is its wider
scope. Moreover, as we discuss below, it is not known whether the approach of
[FRW13] works for Heyting’s Arithmetic HA, the constructive counterpart of PA,
where our approach works without problems.
An alternative approach to obtain a provability style predicate that satisfies both
the Lo¨b Conditions and the Kreisel Condition can be found in Section 5 of [Vis16b].
The approach in the present paper has a number of advantages. First, it is
somewhat more perspicuous. Secondly, the constructed predicates also satisfy the
Hilbert-Bernays Condition. Thirdly, the construction of the predicates is fixed-
point-free. Fourthly, using the present approach we can also, in a number of cases,
construct predicates △ with the desired properties that are Fefermanian.
The basic idea for the predicate constructed in this paper is due to Fedor Pakhomov.
He suggested considering this predicate when I asked him whether there was a non-
model theoretic proof of the absorption law for slow provability. However, the proof
of absorption given in this paper is quite different from the one Fedor had in mind.
1.2. Prerequisites. The reader should be familiar with basic materials from [HP93].
For certain local results there may be further prerequisites but we will make these
clear in situ.
2. Basic Conventions, Notations, Definitions
In this section we introduce basic conventions and fix some notations and give
some definitions.
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2.1. Theories. A theory U in this paper is a theory in the signature of arithmetic.2
A theory is given by a set X of axioms. We will generally assume that X is
a recursively enumerable set. However, X is just given as a set and it is not
intrinsically connected with a presentation. We will assume as a default that U
extends Elementary Arithmetic EA.
Two salient theories of the paper are Elementary Arithmetic EA and Peano
Arithmetic PA. The theory EA is I∆0 + exp. It is finitely axiomatizable by a single
axiom B. See [HP93]. The predicate x = pBq will be called β. The theory PA has
a standard elementary presentation π of the axiom set.
We will also consider the extension of EA with the Σ01-collection principle BΣ
0
1.
This principle is given by:
⊢ ∀x ≤ a ∃y S0(x, y)→ ∃b ∀x ≤ a ∃y ≤ b S0(x, y).
Here S0 is Σ
0
1.
2.2. Arithmetization. We will sometimes use implementation properties of the
arithmetization like monotonicity and the efficiency of syntactical operations. For
this reason, we outline a few features of the Go¨del coding we intend to use. We use
a style of Go¨del numbering that is due to Smullyan (see [Smu61]). Our Go¨del num-
bering is based on the length-first ordering. We enumerate the strings of our finite
alphabet according to length and the strings of the same length alphabetically. The
Go¨del number of a string s will be the number of occurrence in this enumeration.
In this ordering the arithmetical function tracing concatenation is of the order of
multiplication. We can use our bijective coding of strings to implement sequences
of numbers. This has the bonus that also concatenation of sequences of numbers
will be of the order of multiplication.3
We will in many cases employ modal notations. E.g., let provα be the arithmeti-
zation of provability from the axioms in α. We write 2αA for provα(pAq). Here
pAq is the numeral of the Go¨del number of A. We will sometimes quantify the
sentence-variables inside a modal operator. For example, we write things like:
(†) ∀A,B ((2αA ∧ 2α(A→ B))→ 2αB).
This stands for:
(‡) ∀x∀y ∀z ((provα(x) ∧ imp(x, y, z) ∧ provα(z))→ provα(y)).
Admittedly, such notations are somewhat sloppy, but I think in practice they are
very convenient. E.g., (†) is more pleasant to read than (‡).
We employ the usual conventions for quantifiying numerical variables into modal
contexts. E.g. 2αA(x) means ∃z (sub(x, pv0q, pA(v0)q, z) ∧ provα(z)).
We will employ the witness comparison notation. Suppose A = ∃xA0(x) and
B = ∃xB0(x). We write:
• A ≤ B for ∃x (A0(x) ∧ ∀y < x¬B0(y)).
• A < B for ∃x (A0(x) ∧ ∀y ≤ x¬B0(y)).
2Everything in the paper lifts to the more general case where a theory of arithmetic is inter-
pretable in the given theory. However, it is pleasant to avoid the extra notational burden of the
more general case. The notational burdens of the present paper seem to be sufficiently heavy.
3Usually there is some overhead in defining sequences since we want to add some materials to
make the definition of the projection function easy. However the uses of sequences to define syntax
and proofs usually only require that we can determine whether something occurs in a sequence
before something else. For this one does not need the extra material.
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2.3. Ordering of Predicates for Axioms. Let γ(x) and δ(x) be formulas with
only x free that EA-verifiably represent classes of arithmetical sentences. We write
γ  δ for EA ⊢ ∀A (provγ(A)→ provδ(A)). Here provα is a standard arithmetization
of provability from α.
3. Conditions for Provability Predicates
In this section, we introduce three (classes of) Conditions that aim to explicate
when a predicate is a provability predicate.
3.1. The Lo¨b Conditions. To state the Lo¨b conditions we write △A for P (pAq)
and ⊢ for provability in U . The Lo¨b conditions (introduced in [Lo¨b55]) are as
follows.
L1. If ⊢ A, then ⊢ △A
L2. ⊢ (△A ∧ △(A→ B))→ △B
L3. ⊢ △A→ △△A
We obtain the Hilbert-Bernays Conditions in case we replace L3 by:
HB. ⊢ S → △S, for Σ01-sentences S,
The usual assumption connected to the Hilbert-Bernays conditions is that P be Σ01,
so that L3 is a special case of HB. It is easy to see that if P is not Σ01, we can have
L1, 2 and HB but not L4. E.g. we may take P to be Feferman provability over PA.
We note that, in case P is Σ01, the Lo¨b conditions are more general than the
Hilbert-Bernays Conditions. For example, in a weak theory like S12 we do have the
Lo¨b Conditions for a standard provability predicate, but it is unknown whether we
have the Hilbert-Bernays Conditions.
Technically, the Lo¨b Conditions constitute a superior analysis of the proof of
the Second Incompleteness Theorem. The philosophical use of the Conditions is
independent of their technical interest. The philosophical idea is that the Lo¨b
Conditions explicate the theoretical role that a provability predicate plays in a
theory.
We note that the Lo¨b conditions do depend on the choice of Go¨del numbering
and hence are still not entirely ‘coordinatefree’. For a study of this dependence and
a proposal to abstract away from it, see [Gra18].
The Lo¨b Conditions also have a uniform and a global version. In the uniform
version we allow parameters in the formulas inside the operator. For example, L2
becomes: ⊢ ∀~x (△A(~x ) ∧ △(A(~x ) → B(~x ))) → △B(~x ). In the global version, the
quantifiers over sentences are not outside but inside the theory. For example, L2
becomes: ⊢ ∀A,B ∈ sent ((△A ∧ △(A → B)) → △B). We note that the global
version is stronger than the uniform one. We will not consider the strengthened
conditions in the present paper.
3.2. The Kreisel Condition. TheKreisel Condition was first formulated in [Kre53].
Its statement is as follows:
K. U ⊢ △A iff U ⊢ A.
We note that the Kreisel Condition is of a quite different nature than the Lo¨b
Conditions. It just asks that the theory numerates its own provability.
One could imagine a variant of the Kreisel Condition where we just ask numer-
ability in a base theory U0 that is a sub-theory of U .
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Finally, we observe that, like the Lo¨b Conditions, the Kreisel Condition does
depend on the chosen Go¨del numbering.
3.3. The Feferman Condition. We explain the idea that a provability-predicate
is Fefermanian. See [Fef60]. The main ingredient of the idea is simply to fix
a preferred arithmetization of provability and allow the choice of the predicate
α representing the axiom-set to be free, given that it satisfies certain adequacy
conditions.
The best way to present a Fefermanian predicate is to view it as a tuple 〈U0, U, α〉.
Here U0 is the base theory and U is the lead theory. We ask that U extends the
base U0. We demand that α numerates the axiom set in the base theory U0. So A
is an axiom of U iff U0 ⊢ α(pAq).
We note that the demands on a Fefermanian predicate treat the axioms of the
lead theory via a condition similar to the Kreisel Condition.
In the present paper, we will consider Fefermanian predicate modulo provability
in the base theory. Thus, we will say that P is Fefermanian for U over U0 in the
relaxed sense iff, there is an α such that 〈U0, U, α〉 is Fefermanian in the strict sense
and U0 ⊢ ∀x (P (x)↔ provα(x)).
The reader may object that the Feferman Condition does not count as a real
condition since it employs an unspecified specification of the arithmetization.4 Of
course, the reader is correct here. Feferman, in his paper, does specify a choice
for a proof system and an arithmetization. However, in Feferman’s arithmetization
the Go¨del number of a formula is superexponential in its length, so it is not a con-
venient Go¨del numbering to work with within EA. Moreover, if Feferman’s specific
Go¨del numbering would really be the golden standard, it would be reasonable that
everybody would know its specification, but, of course, that is not the case. I see
the use of the Feferman idea more as dialogical. The reader is asked to take her
favored good arithmetization in mind and read for prov provability according to
that arithmetization. So, prov becomes context dependent like the word ‘you’. I
will employ the Feferman idea in this way.
3.4. Properties of Fefermanian Predicates. In this subsection we briefly con-
sider some basic insights on Fefermanian predicates.
Let AU be the class of all α in Σ
0
1 such that 〈EA, U, α〉 is Fefermanian.
Theorem 3.1. Let U be a theory. Then AU has a minimum w.r.t.  iff U is
finitely axiomatizable.
Proof. Suppose U is finitely axiomatizable, say by A0, . . . , An−1. Let α0(x) :=∨
i<n x = pAiq. Consider any α in AU . We find for i < n that U ⊢ Ai, and, hence
EA ⊢ 2αAi.
We reason in EA. Suppose p witnesses 2α0A and pi, for i < n, witnesses 2αAi.
We obtain an α-proof q of A by adding the pi ‘above’ Ai to p. (Note that we do
not need Σ01-collection since n is standard.)
Suppose U is not finitely axiomatizable. Consider any α ∈ AU . Clearly, for any n
there is a B such that U ⊢ B but the axioms in α that are ≤ n do not prove B.
4As remarked above the other conditions suffer, admittedly to a lesser degree, from the same
defect.
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Hence, C := ∀x∃B (2αB ∧ ¬2αxB) is true, where αx(y) :↔ α(y) ∧ y ≤ x. Thus,
EA+ C is consistent. Let γ(x) :↔ β(x) ∨ x = pCq. We define:
α′(x) :↔ α(x) ∧ ∀y ≤ x¬ proofγ(x, p⊥q).
It is evident that α′  α. Suppose (†) α  α′. We reason inside EA + C. By
(†), we have ∀B (2αB → 2α′B). Suppose p is a γ-proof of ⊥. It follows that the
α′ axioms are below p. Consider B such that 2αB but not 2αpB. It follows that
¬2α′B. A contradiction. It follows that there is no γ-proof of ⊥, in other words,
3γ⊤. We leave EA+ C.
We have shown EA+ C ⊢ 3γ⊤. But this contradics the Second Incompleteness
Theorem. Hence (†) must fail. 2
Theorem 3.2. Consider theories U0 and U where EA is a sub-theory of U0 and
U0 is a sub-theory of U . Suppose:
a. P numerates U in U0.
b. P contains U0-provably all predicate-logical tautologies.
c. P is U0-provably closed under finite conjunctions.
d. P is U0-provably closed under modus ponens.
Then, P is Fefermanian for U over U0 with P itself as representation of the axiom
set.
Proof. Clearly, we have U0 ⊢ ∀B ∈ P provP (B). Conversely, reason in U0. Suppose
p is a P -proof of B. LetX be the finite set of P -axioms used in p. Then, (
∧
X → B)
is a predicate logical tautology, so (
∧
X → B) ∈ P . By closure under conjunction,
we have
∧
X ∈ P . Hence, by closure under modus ponens, we find B ∈ P . 2
Theorem 3.3. Consider theories U0 and U where IΣ
0
1 is a sub-theory of U0 and
U0 is a sub-theory of U . Suppose:
a. P numerates U in U0.
b. P contains U0-provably all predicate-logical tautologies.
c. P is U0-provably closed under modus ponens.
Then P is Fefermanian for U over U0 with P itself as representation of the axiom
set.
Proof. Under the assumptions of the theorem, we can prove that P is closed under
finite conjunctions by Σ01-induction. 2
Example 3.4. We take as base and lead theory PA. The predicate 2π2π is Fefer-
manian. Similarly, for ∃x2x+1π (·). The last predicate is, modulo PA-provable equiv-
alence, Parikh provability or fast provability. Parikh provability can be obtained by
adding to an axiomatization based on π the Reflection Rule: ⊢ 2πA ⇒ ⊢ A. See
[Par71]. See also [Hen16].
Theorem 3.5. Suppose U extends EA and P is Fefermanian w.r.t. a ∆0(exp)-
presentation α of the axiom set. Then, P satisfies the Lo¨b Conditions.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose U extends EA + BΣ01 and P is Fefermanian w.r.t. a Σ1-
presentation α of the axiom set. Then, P satisfies the Lo¨b Conditions.
Theorem 3.7. Suppose 〈U0, U, α〉 is a strict Fefermanian representation and sup-
pose U and U0 are sound. Then, α satisfies the Kreisel Condition for U .
THE ABSORPTION LAW 7
Proof. Since U0 is sound, we have α(pAq) iff U0 ⊢ α(pAq). So, α truly represents
the axioms of U . It follows that U ⊢ A iff 2αA. Since U is sound, we find 2αA iff
U ⊢ 2αA. So, we may conclude U ⊢ A iff U ⊢ 2αA. 2
3.5. Examples. We provide a list of examples for coincidence and separation of
the conditions. As before β is the standard representation of the axiom of EA and
π is the standard representation of the axioms set of Peano Arithmetic. We will,
in our examples, prefer EA over PA, Σ01-predicates over more complex ones, and
sound theories over unsound ones. Only in the first examples of Example A.5 and
Example A.7, perhaps, improvement is possible by finding an example that works
for and over EA.
base lead P Lo¨b Kreisel Feferman
Example A.1 EA EA Σ01 + + +
Example A.2 EA EA Σ01 + + −
Example A.3 EA EA+2β⊥ Σ
0
1 + − +
EA EA Σ02
Example A.4 EA EA Σ01 + − −
Example A.5 PA PA Σ02 − + +
EA EA Σ01,1
Example A.6 EA EA Σ01 − + −
Example A.7 PA PA Σ02 − − +
EA EA+2β2π⊥ Σ
0
1,1
Example A.8 EA EA Σ01 − − −
We will give the promised examples in Appendix A.
4. Combining Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b and Kreisel
We will first present the basic form of our argument in abstracto and then con-
struct concrete implementations.
4.1. The Basic Argument. In this subsection we present our main technical
argument. The center of the subsection is the proof of Lemma 4.1.
Let U be a theory. Suppose α(x) is an elementary predicate that numerates the
axioms of U in U . Let θ(y, z) be a Σ01 binary predicate. We demand that θ is
EA-verifiably, upwards persistent in y, i.e., we assume that
EA ⊢ (θ(y, z) ∧ y < y′)→ θ(y′, z).
Let θ,yA be θ(y, pAq). We write yA as long as θ is given in the context. We
define:
• true is the Σ01-truth predicate, which is of the form ∃y true0(y, x), where
true0 is ∆0(exp). We write true
z(x) for ∃y ≤ z true0(y, x).
• 2α,(x)A :↔ ∃p ≤ x proofα(p, pAq), where proof is the standard arithmeti-
zation of the proof predicate.5
• S(x) :↔ ∃z ∀S ≤ x (2α,(x)S → true
z(S)). Here the variable ‘S’ ranges over
Σ01-sentences.
5I use the round brackets to distinguish the intended notion from 2α,x which is used in some
of the literature for 2αx , where αx(y) :↔ α(x) ∧ y ≤ x.
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• △θA :↔ ∃x(θ,xA ∧ S(x)). We will usually write △ for △θ suppressing the
contextually given θ. We note that modulo some rewriting △θ is Σ
0
1.
The definition of △θ is in essence due to Fedor Pakhomov.
As explained in Subsection 2.2, we assume that we have a reasonable coding of
proofs in which the code of the proof is larger than the code of the conclusion. We
fix, for the moment θ in the background. We have:
(†) EA ⊢ △A → ∃x (xA ∧ ∀S (2α,(x)S → true(S)))
EA+ BΣ1 ⊢ △A ↔ ∃x (xA ∧ ∀S (2α,(x)S → true(S)))
We note that we can write the right-hand-side of (†) as:
(∃x x A) < (∃x∃S (2α,(x)S ∧ ¬ true(S))).
Here the witness comparison is only concerned with the outer quantifiers.
Lemma 4.1. EA+ ∀x (2α x A→ 2αA) ⊢ 2α△A→ 2αA.
Proof. We find R such that EA ⊢ R↔ (∃x x A) < 2αR. We note that R is Σ
0
1.
We reason in EA+ ∀x (2α x A→ 2αA). Suppose 2α△A. We prove 2αA.
We reason inside 2α. Since, by assumption, △A, we have, for some x, (i) xA and
(ii) ∀S ≤ x (2α,(x)S → true(S)). In case not 2α,(x)R, by (i), we find R. If we do
have 2α,(x)R, we find R by (ii). We leave the 2α-environment.
We have shown 2αR. It follows, (a) that for some p, we have 2α2α,(p)R and, by
the fixed point equation for R, (b) 2α((∃x x A) < 2αR). Combining (a) and (b)
and the upward persistence of x, we find 2α p A, and, thus, 2αA, as desired.
We leave EA+ ∀x (2α x A→ 2αA).
We have shown EA+ ∀x (2α x A→ 2αA) ⊢ 2α△A→ 2αA. 2
The proof of Lemma 4.1 deserves a few comments.
Remark 4.2. We note that the argument also works when we define △A as
∃x (xA ∧ ∀S (2α,(x)S → true(S))). The argument does not use that △ is Σ
0
1.
Remark 4.3. In all applications of Lemma 4.1, EA verifies not just the principle
∀x (2α x A → 2αA) for the concrete choice of  of the application, but the
stronger ∀x2α(xA→ A). We note that using this last condition, we may obtain
the theorem without the demand that y is upward persistent in y. In EA +
∀x2α(xA → A), we can go from 2α2α,(p)R and 2α((∃x x A) < 2αR) to
2α
∨
z<p zA, and, hence, 2αA.
Remark 4.4. The proof of Lemma 4.1 does not use exponentiation and would
work in S12. The reason is that we only use true(R)→ R, which is the direction of
true(R)↔ R that does not require exponentiation.
Remark 4.5. Let i-EA be the constructive version of EA. Let U be a constructive
theory that extends i-EA. Suppose i-EA ⊢ (θ(y, z) ∧ y < y′)→ θ(y′, z).
Then, inspection shows that the entire proof of Lemma 4.1 also works when we
substitute i-EA for EA. This uses the basic insight that 2α,(x)R is decidable in i-EA.
So the case-splitting in the proof can be constructively justified.
Thus, we find i-EA+ ∀x (2α x A→ 2αA) ⊢ 2α△A→ 2αA.
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For the next theorem, we need an important lemma. The lemma, or at least the
basic proof idea, is well known. However, just for the record, it is good to have an
explicit proof.
Lemma 4.6. EA ⊢ ∀x2αS(x).
Proof. We work in EA. We prove the desired result by induction on x. We need a
multi-exponential bound for the 2α-proofs. We will extract the desired bound by
inspecting the induction step.
The base case is trivial since there will be no S ≤ 0. The proof witnessing the base
will be given by a standard number n.
We turn to the induction step. Suppose p0 witnesses 2αS(x). We have two pos-
sibilities: proofα(x + 1, S
∗), for some S∗ ≤ x + 1, or ¬ proofα(x + 1, S
∗), for all
S∗ ≤ x+ 1.
Suppose proofα(x + 1, S
∗). Inspecting the proof of the truth-lemma for true
in [HP93, Ch V, Section 5b, pp361–366], we obtain a proof code p1 such that
proofα(p1, S
∗ → true(S∗)). The transformation S∗ 7→ p1 is p-time. By [HP93,
Ch III, Lemma 3.14, p175], we obtain an α-proof p2 of proofα(x + 1, S
∗). The
transformation x+ 1 7→ p2 is of order 2
x+1
k , where k is standard and the subscript
k indicates the number of iterations of exponentiation. Working inside 2α we can
put these facts together to obtain (a) S(x), (b) proofα(x+ 1, S
∗) and (c) true(S∗).
Let z0 be the witness of (a), let z1 be the witness of (c). Then, it is easily seen that
z := max(z0, z1) witnesses S(x+ 1).
Suppose ∀S∗ ≤ x + 1¬ proofα(x + 1, S
∗). By [HP93, Ch III, Lemma 3.14,
p175], we may find an α-proof p3 of ∀S
∗ ≤ x + 1¬ proofα(x + 1, S
∗) where the
transformation x+1 7→ p3 is of order 2
x+1
k . Using (d) ∀S
∗ ≤ x+1¬ proofα(x+1, S
∗)
inside 2α, we easily find the desired proof of S(x + 1).
We note that apart from a bit of overhead we extend p0 with at most two proofs
that are estimated by 2x+1k . So, the resulting proof will be of order p0 × (2
x+1
k )
2.
Thus, after all is said and done, the proof we obtain of S(x + 1) will be estimated
by n× (2x+1k )
2(x+1) = 22
x+1
k−1
×2(x+1) ≤ 22x+1k , assuming that k ≥ 2. 2
Lemma 4.7. EA ⊢ ∀x2α(xA→ △A). Hence,
EA+ (2αA→ ∃x2α x A) ⊢ 2αA→ 2α△A.
Proof. We work in EA. Let x be given. By Lemma 4.6, we find 2αS(x). Thus,
2α(xA→ (xA ∧ S(x))). This gives us 2α(xA→ △A). 2
Lemma 4.8. EA+ ∀x ((xA∧x(A→ B))→ xB) ⊢ (△A ∧△(A→ B))→ △B.
Proof. We work in EA + ∀x ((xA ∧ x(A → B)) → xB). Suppose △A and
△(A→ B). It follows that, for some x, we have xA and S(x) and that, for some
y, we have y(A → B) and S(y). Let z := max(x, y). It is easily seen that zA
and z(A→ B) and S(z). Hence, zB and S(z), and, thus, △B. 2
Lemma 4.9. EA+ ∀S ∃x2α(S → xS) ⊢ 2α(S → △S).
Proof. This is immediate by Lemma 4.7. 2
We formulate the obvious theorem that follows from the Lemmas. Let Wα,θ be EA
plus the following principles:
10 ALBERT VISSER
a. ∀x (2α x A→ 2αA)
b. 2αA→ ∃x2α x A
c. ∀x ((xA ∧x(A→ B))→ xB)
d. ∀S ∃x2α(S → xS)
Let W+α,θ be EA plus the following principles.
A. 2α△A→ 2αA
B. 2αA→ 2α△A
C. (△A ∧ △(A→ B))→ △B
D. ∀S 2α(S → △S)
Theorem 4.10. Let α be a ∆0(exp)-predicate that numerates the axioms of U
in EA, or, equivalently, in true arithmetic. Let θ be a Σ01-predicate that satisfies
EA ⊢ (θ(y, z) ∧ y < y′)→ θ(y′, z). Then, Wα,θ implies W
+
α,θ.
The logic GLT is the bimodal propositional logic which has GL both for 2 and △,
plus the following principles.
• ⊢ △φ→ 2φ.
• ⊢ 2φ→ △2φ.
• ⊢ 2φ→ 2△φ.
• ⊢ 2△φ→ 2φ.
By Theorem 4.10, we have:
Theorem 4.11. Let α be a ∆0(exp)-predicate that numerates the axioms of U
in EA, or, equivalently, in true arithmetic. Let θ be a Σ01-predicate that satisfies
EA ⊢ (θ(y, z) ∧ y < y′)→ θ(y′, z).
Suppose Wα,θ is a true theory and U ⊢ Wα,θ. Then GLT is arithmetically valid
in U . In addition, U satisfies HB both for 2α and for △θ. Finally, △θ satisfies the
Kreisel Condition in U .
4.2. Extensions of Peano Arithmetic. Let U be a consistent extension of PA
and let α be an elementary predicate numerating the axioms of U in EA with π  α.
We note that, equivalently, α numerates the axioms of U in true arithmetic. Let
αz(x) :↔ α(x) ∧ x ≤ z. We take Θα(z, x) := provαz(x) in the role of θ. Thus, we
have 2αzA = Θα(z, pAq) in the role of zA and we have 2˜αA := ∃z (2αzA∧S(z))
the role of △A.
We define: α˜(a) :↔ α(a) ∧ S(a). We have:
Lemma 4.12. EA ⊢ ∀A (2˜αA↔ 2α˜A).
Proof. We reason in EA.
Suppose 2˜αA. Then, for some z, we have 2αzA and S(z). Suppose p witnesses
2αzA and B is an axiom used in p. Then, α(B) and B ≤ z. Since S is downward
persistent w.r.t. ≤, we find S(B), and, hence, α˜(B).
Conversely, suppose 2α˜A. let q be a witnessing proof. Let B be the maximal
α-axiom used in q. We find S(B). Thus, 2αBA and S(B), i.e., 2˜αA. 2
Lemma 4.13. The predicate α˜ numerates the axioms of U in U . Hence, 2˜α is
Fefermanian in U over U .
Proof. Let X be the axioms set of U .
Suppose n ∈ X . Then α(n) and hence U ⊢ α(n). Since also, by Lemma 4.6, we
have U ⊢ S(n), it follows that U ⊢ α˜(n).
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Suppose n 6∈ X . Then ¬α(n). Hence, U ⊢ ¬α(n). Hence U ⊢ ¬ α˜(n). 2
Lemma 4.14. EA verifies Wα,Θα .
Proof. The principle (a) follows by essential reflexivity. The principles (b) and (c)
are trivial. The principle (c) follows since for a sufficiently large n we will have, in
EA, that 2αnB, where B is a single axiom for EA. 2
By Theorem 4.11 and Lemma 4.14 we find:
Theorem 4.15. The logic GLT is arithmetically valid for 2α and for 2α˜ over U .
In addition, we have HB both for 2α and for 2α˜ over U . Finally, 2α˜ satisfies the
Kreisel Condition in U .
In case U is sound, one easily sees that the pair 2α and 2α˜ satisfies the conditions
of Theorem 16 of [HP16]. It follows that GLT is precisely the bi-modal propositional
logic of 2α and 2α˜ in U , for sound U .
We started the basic construction of this subsection with an α such that π  α.
We note that we do not get π  α˜, so the construction cannot be iterated.
Remark 4.16. The soundness proofs of our subsection can be extended to con-
structive logic. In this case we still have the representations β for the axiom set
of i-EA and π for the axiom set of HA. So the whole development remains un-
changed. One just has to check that never an essentially classical step was taken.
The completeness proof for the cosntructive version of GLT fails radically, since the
completeness proof for the the constructive version of GL w.r.t. 2α already fails,
as is illustrated e.g. in [LV18].
The intuitionistic development has an important point. In their paper [AM14],
Mohammad Ardeshir and Mojtaba Mojtahedi characterize the provability logic of
HA for Σ01-substitutions. This is the most informative result on the provability
logic of HA at the moment of writing. An alternative proof is been developed
in [VZ18]. This proof uses slow provability in the style of Friedman, Rathjen
& Weiermann for HA. The proof works because only a restricted version of the
absorption law is needed. The validity of the full absorption law is plausible but
not proved. Replacement by of Friedman-Rathjen-Weiermann slow provability by
slow provability in the style of the present paper (as suggested by Fedor Pakhomov)
does give us full absorption.
We show that we get a strengthened version of absorption in the case of HA.
The proof is intended for readers with some background in the metamathematics
of constructive arithmetical theories.
Theorem 4.17. i-EA ⊢ 2π(A ∨B)↔ 2π(A ∨ 2π˜B).
Proof. We reason in i-EA.
Suppose 2π(A∨B). It follows by either q-realizability or the de Jongh translation
that, for some x, we have 2π(A ∨2πxB). From this we have 2π(A ∨2π˜B).
Conversely, suppose 2π(A ∨ 2π˜B). By the left-to-right case (with change of
variables), we have 2π(2π˜A ∨ 2π˜B). Hence, 2π2π˜(A ∨ B). So, by absorption,
2π(A ∨B). 2
Thus, the alternative predicates that satisfy the absorption law also have a rich
constructive life.
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Remark 4.18. Let EA + ref be EA plus sentential reflection for predicate logic.
Let τ be a standard axiomatization for EA+ ref. Let U be an extension of EA+ ref
and let α be an elementary axiomatization of U such that τ  α. With these basic
ingredients we can repeat the development of the present section noting that we
are always looking at sentential reflection rather than uniform reflection.
In [Vis14] we introduced the theory Peano Corto, which has many analogies
to EA + ref. It would be interesting to see how much of our development can be
repeated for the case of Peano Corto.
5. Extensions of Elementary Arithmetic
We first take a moment to see that, in order to get the desired combinations of
properties for extensions of EA, we indeed need to leave the realm of the Fefermanian
predicates.
5.1. Two Examples. Our first example addresses the case that we only demand
that our Fefermanian predicate is Kreiselian.
Example 5.1. Consider the theory U := EA + 2β⊥. Suppose there would be a
Fefermanian predicate for U over EA that is Kreiselian. Say the witnessing predicate
for the axiom set is α. Let γ(x) :↔ β(x) ∨ x = p2β⊥q. We have γ  α. Since,
U ⊢ 2β⊥, it follows that U ⊢ 2γ⊥, and, hence, U ⊢ 2α⊥. So, U ⊢ ⊥. Quod non.
In the previous example, we needed an unsound theory. In our second example, we
consider the case that our example satisfies absorption. Here we can use a sound
theory.
Example 5.2. Let U := EA. Suppose there is a Fefermanian predicate P based
on α for EA over EA. We write △ for P . We note that β  α. Suppose we would
have the absorption law for △ and 2β . Then, it would follow that:
EA ⊢ 2β2β⊥ → 2β△⊥
→ 2β⊥
Quod non.
Open Question 5.3. We note that our examples are of finitely axiomatized the-
ories. The construction of Section 4.2 gives us Fefermanian predicates for theories
extending Peano Arithmetic. As pointed out in Remark 4.18, we can improve this
to extensions of EA + ref. Obviously there is a big gap between examples and
counter examples. So, there is some further work to be done to narrow the gap.
5.2. Motivating Remarks for Our Construction. We may construct the de-
sired predicatesx in many ways. However, it good to maximize the meaningfulness
of the construction. Obviously, this is good for didactic reasons. However, I also
think it may help to inspire further work.
As a first step, we note that we have the conditions of Theorems 4.1 and 4.7, for
2α,(x). So, to obtain absorption and emission, x := 2α,(x) is already sufficient.
The idea of our construction is simply to add closure under modus ponens and
closure under HB in a minimal way to 2α,(x).
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The minimal way to obtain the addition of modus ponens is simply to close of
the α-theorems with proofs ≤ x under modus ponens. However, we can strengthen
the analogy with our approach to the case of extensions of PA by working with
a Hilbert system that only has modus ponens as a rule. Such deduction systems
are described in [Qui96] (first edition 1940) and in [Fef60]. When we have such a
system we can, for the definition of x, consider the theorems whose proofs contain
only axioms whether logical or non-logical which are ≤ x. Thus, the main difference
between our approach for the extensions of PA and the new one is that we stop
treating logical and non-logical axioms as different.
What to do to obtain the Hilbert-Bernays condition? Simple: we add the true
Σ01-sentences to our original axiom set.
There is a small technical complication, due to the lack of Σ01-collection, that
necessitates us to stipulate a bound on the witnesses of the truth of the Σ01 sen-
tences involved in a proof, but this complication disappears as soon as we have
Σ01-collection in the ambient theory.
5.3. The Construction. We fix a Hilbert system H with as only rule modus po-
nens. Let logic(x) be a ∆0(exp)-formula that numerates the axioms of H in EA.
We assume that a Σ01-sentence begins with a, possibly vacuous, existential quan-
tifier.
We give the basic definitions for our approach. Let a theory U be given and a
∆0(exp)-formula α that numerates the axioms of U in EA (or, equivalently, in true
arithmetic).
• We define ass◦(p) as the set of assumptions op p, where now a logical axiom
also counts as an assumption. In other words, anything not proved from
previous items using modus ponens counts as an assumption.
• We write proof◦γ(p, x) for proof(p, x) ∧ ∀y ∈ ass
◦(p) γ(y).
• We write γA for ∃p proof
◦
γ(p, pAq).
• B is a direct ◦-subformula of A if A is of the form (C → B) or (B → C).
The ◦-subformulas of A are the smallest set that contains A and is closed
under taking direct ◦-subformulas.
• α+(a) := α(a) ∨ logic(a) ∨ true(a).
• α˜+(a) := (α(a) ∨ logic(a) ∨ true(a)) ∧ S(a).
• α+x,z(a) :↔ (α(a) ∨ logic(a) ∨ true
z(a)) ∧ a ≤ x.
• α+x (a) :↔ (α(a) ∨ logic(a) ∨ true(a)) ∧ a ≤ x.
• Θ◦α(x,A) :↔ α+x,∗A :↔ ∃z α+x,zA. We use Θ
◦
α in the role of θ. So α+x,∗(·)
has the role of x.
• We define ˜α+A :↔ ∃x (α+x,∗A ∧ S(x)). So, ˜α+ has the role of △.
In case we have Σ01-collection, the situation simplifies. We note that in the absence
of Σ01-collection α+xA is not Σ
0
1 but Σ
0
1,1. We have:
Lemma 5.4. a. EA ⊢ α+x,∗A→ α+xA.
b. EA+ BΣ1 ⊢ α+xA↔ α+x,∗A.
c. EA ⊢ ˜α+A→ α˜+A.
d. EA+ BΣ1 ⊢ α˜+A↔ ˜α+A.
Proof. (a) is trivial. (b) is an immediate application of collection. (c) and (d) are
analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.12, using respectively (a) and (b). 2
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Suppose U is a consistent theory with axiom set X that extends EA+BΣ1. Suppose
α is a ∆0(exp)-formula numeratingX in U . Let X˜ be the X plus logic plus the set of
Σ01-sentences S such that U ⊢ S and let U˜ be the theory axiomatized by X˜ . Then,
α˜+A is analogous to a Fefermanian predicate for U˜ over U˜ . The difference is only
that we switch from provability over predicate logic to modus-ponens provability.
We start with a well-known lemma.
Lemma 5.5. Suppose U extends EA. Let α be a ∆0(exp)-predicate numerating the
axiom set of U over EA. Then, EA ⊢ ∀x,A2α(2α,(x)A→ A).
Proof. We reason in EA. Suppose, for some p ≤ x, we have proofα(p,A). It clearly
follows that 2αA and, hence, a fortiori, 2α(2α,(x)A→ A).
Suppose, for all q ≤ x, we have ¬ proofα(q, A). If follows, by Σ
0
1-completeness,
that 2α∀q ≤ p¬ proofα(q, A). In other words, 2α¬2α,(x)A. If follows that
2α(2α,(x)A→ A). 2
The next lemma is in the spirit of the previous one, but takes a bit more work.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose U extends EA. Let α be a ∆0(exp)-predicate numerating the
axiom set of U over EA. We have EA ⊢ ∀x,A2α(α+x,∗A→ A).
Proof. We will use a well-known fact, to wit that
EA ⊢ ∀x2α∀y (y ≤ x↔
∨
z≤x
z = y).
This fact means that we do not have to worry that undesirable non-standard ele-
ments creep in below elements that are internally standard in EA.
We reason in EA. Let x be given.
We reason inside 2α. Suppose ($) α+x,∗A. Let z and p witness α+x,∗A. Keeping z
fixed, we may, by the ∆0(exp)-mimimum Principle, find a p0 that is minimal with
this property.
Suppose that p0 contains a formula B twice. If B is the conclusion A of p0
we may omit the part after the first occurrence of A, obtaining a shorter proof.
This contradicts the minimality of p0. If B is not the conclusion of p0, we may
omit all occurrences of B after the first one, obtaining a shorter proof. This again
contradicts the minimality of p0. We may conclude that all sentences in p0 occur
only once in p0.
We claim that every formula that is a (sub)conclusion of p0 is a ◦-subformula of
a formula in ass◦(p0). Suppose not. Let B be the first such formula. Clearly, B
cannot be a ◦-assumption. So, it must be the conclusion of an application of modus
ponens and, thus, a direct ◦-subformula of a previous formula of the form (C → B).
But this formula is by assumption a ◦-subformula of ass◦(p0). A contradiction.
So, all sentences occurring in p0 are in ◦-subformulas of ass
◦(p0) and occur only
once. It follows that the sentences in p0 are all ≤ x and, hence, the number of
these sentences is also ≤ x. So, by our assumptions on coding, we find p0 ≈ x
x.
So, certainly p0 will be estimated by 2
x2 + k, for a sufficiently large standard k.
It follows that
∨
q≤2x2+k proof
◦
α+(q, A) and, hence, (†)
∨
q≤2x2+k proofα∪true(q, A).
(Here the q are standard on the 2α-external EA-level.)
Now, suppose (‡) proofα∪true(q, A), where q ≤ 2
x2+k. We transform q as follows.
Let S be the set of the Σ01-sentences in ass(q) that are not in α. It follows that
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all S ∈ S are true. We transform q in two steps. First we form a proof q′ from
the assumptions (ass(q) \S ) ∪
∧
S with conclusion A. Then, we transform q′ to
q′′ with assumptions ass(q) \ S to
∧
S → A. We note that the big conjunction
makes sense, since
∧
S ≈ q which is 2α-external.
We easily see that |q′| can be bounded by a linear term in |q|. The transformation
q′ 7→ q′′ uses the deduction theorem. Inspection of the proof shows that here also
|q′′| is linear in |q′|. Thus, q′′ is bounded by 2mx
2
+n, for appropriate standardm and
n. We conclude that q′′ is also 2α-external. We have found that 2αq′′ (
∧
S → A),
where q′′ is 2α-external.
We apply Lemma 5.5 to obtain
∧
S → A. We also have
∧
{true(S) | S ∈ S }.
Combining these, we find A.
By (†) we find A without assumption (‡). We now cancel ($) to obtain the
sentence: α+x,∗A→ A.
We leave the 2α-environment. We have shown 2α(α+x,∗A→ A), as desired. 2
We insert a quick corollary of Lemma 5.6.
Corollary 5.7. EA ⊢ ∀A (∃x α+x,∗ A↔ 2αA).
Proof. We reason in EA. The left-to-right direction works as follows. We use
Lemma 5.6.
∃x α+x,∗ A → ∃x2α α+x,∗ A
→ 2αA
The right-to-left direction is immediate since 2αA implies 2α,(x)A, for some x, and
2α,(x)A implies α+x,∗A. 2
Lemma 5.8. EA verifies Wα,Θ◦α .
Proof. The principle (a) follows by Lemma 5.6. The principle (b) follows by:
EA ⊢ 2αA → ∃x2α(2α,(x)A ∧ S(x))
→ ∃x2α(α+x,∗A ∧ S(x))
The principles (c) and (d) are immediate by the construction of α+x,∗ . 2
By Theorem 4.11 and Lemma 5.8 we find:
Theorem 5.9. The logic GLT is arithmetically valid in U for 2α and ˜α+ . In
addition, we have HB over U both for 2α and for 2α˜. Finally, ˜α+ satisfies the
Kreisel Condition in U .
5.4. An Application. Consider a theory U . Let α be a ∆0(exp)-formula that
numerates the axioms of U in EA. We write △α for ˜α+ . We have:
Theorem 5.10. i. U is Π01-conservative over U + △α⊥.
ii. U is Σ01-conservative over U + ¬△α⊥.
Our result is EA-verifiable w.r.t. 2α.
Proof. We prove (i). Let P be a Π01-sentence. Suppose U + △α⊥ ⊢ P . Then, (a)
U + ¬P ⊢ ¬△α⊥. Hence, U ⊢ △α¬P → △α¬△α⊥. It follows by Σ
0
1-completeness
and the formalized Second Incompleteness Theorem for △α that (b) U+¬P ⊢ △α⊥.
Combining (a) and (b), we find U ⊢ P .
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We prove (ii). Let S be a Σ01-sentence. Suppose U + ¬△α⊥ ⊢ S. It follows that
U ⊢ △α⊥ ∨ S, and, hence, by Σ
0
1-completeness, U ⊢ △αS. By Kreisel/absorption,
we find U ⊢ S.
The EA-verifiability is immediate. 2
The proof of (i) is ascribed by Per Lindstro¨m, in [Lin03, p94], to Georg Kreisel in
[Kre62]. For extensions U of Peano Arithmetic, the existence of a Σ01-sentence S,
such that U is Π01-conservative over U + S and U is Σ
0
1-conservative over U + ¬S
is a special case of a result due to Robert Solovay. See [Gua79]. See also [Lin03,
Chapter 5].
We note that our result implies △α⊥ is a fortiori a Rosser sentence for U . The
resulting proof of Rosser’s Theorem is like the proof of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem in the following sense. The sentence under consideration is self-reference-
free, but in the proof of the desired property we use self-reference.
Remark 5.11. Another example of a self-reference-free Σ01 Rosser sentence (for
extensions of PA) is due to Fedor Pakhomov. See [Pak17]. We note that Pakhomov’s
construction is, in a sense, orthogonal to ours. An essential feature of Pakhomov’s
construction is that, like the ordinary Rosser sentence and its opposite, it produces
Σ01-sentences S0 and S1 each with the Rosser property over U such that we have
U ⊢ ¬ (S0 ∧S1) and U ⊢ 2α⊥ ↔ (S0 ∨S1). It follows that e.g. U ⊢ S0 → ¬S1, but
U 0 ¬S1. So, S0 is not Π
0
1-conservative. The non-Π
0
1-conservativity of Pakhomov’s
sentences is an important feature since it allows him to use them for his alternative
proof of Solovay’s arithmetical completeneness theorem for Lo¨b’s Logic.
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Appendix A. Examples
For convenience, we repeat our overview of the examples.
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base lead P Lo¨b Kreisel Feferman
Example A.1 EA EA Σ01 + + +
Example A.2 EA EA Σ01 + + −
Example A.3 EA EA+2β⊥ Σ
0
1 + − +
EA EA Σ02
Example A.4 EA EA Σ01 + − −
Example A.5 PA PA Σ02 − + +
EA EA Σ01,1
Example A.6 EA EA Σ01 − + −
Example A.7 PA PA Σ02 − − +
EA EA+2β2π⊥ Σ
0
1,1
Example A.8 EA EA Σ01 − − −
Example A.1. +++: We take U0 := U := EA and P := provβ . Clearly, this P
satisfies all three conditions for EA.
We note that our example satisfies the Hilbert-Bernays Condition too.
Example A.2. ++−: In Section 5, we provide an example of a Σ01-predicate P
for U := EA, that satisfies the absorption principle w.r.t. 2β . By Example 5.2, the
predicate P cannot be Fefermanian.
Here is a second example of a somewhat simpler nature. Let U0 := U := EA. We
define provβ,x(y) as the arithmetization of ‘y is provable from β by a proof that
only employs formulas of depth of quantifier alternations at most x’. We define
prov∗β(y) :↔ ∃x (provβ,x(y) ∧ ∀z ≤ x¬ provβ(p⊥q)).
We write 2∗β for prov
∗
β .
It is easy to see that 2∗β satisfies both the Lo¨b Conditions and the Kreisel Con-
dition over EA.
Suppose EA would prove that 2∗β is co-extensional with a Fefermanian predicate.
Let B0 := ⊥ and Bn+1 := ∀v0 ∃v0 Bn.
Reason in EA. Suppose p is a proof of ⊥. It follows that ¬2∗βBp, since Bp is too
complex to be in the scope of 2∗β . On the other hand, since predicate logic proves
Bp, we find, by the Feferman Condition, that 2
∗Bp. A contradiction. So EA is
consistent. We leave EA.
We have shown, on the assumption that prov∗β is Fefermanian in and over EA,
that EA proves its own consistency. Quod non.
A final example is cfprovβ(x), which stands for cut-free provability in EA. Let’s
write 2cfβA for cfprov(pAq). We have Lo¨b’s Logic for 2
cf
β . See [Vis90] and [Kal91].
Also we easily see that 2cfβ satisfies the Kreisel condition. However, 2
cf
β cannot be
Fefermanian for EA over EA. If it were Fefermanian, we would have EA ⊢ 2β⊥ →
2
cf
β⊥. To prove that this is impossible is outside the scope of the present article.
We just give the outline of the proof, so that the reader can see the basic idea.
Suppose EA ⊢ 2β⊥ → 2
cf
β⊥. It follows that EA ⊢ 3
cf
β⊤ → 3β⊤. Then, by a
meta-theorem from [WP87], it follows that (a) S12 + 3
cf
β⊤ ⊢ 3
J
β⊤, for a definable
cut J . We also have that (b) EA interprets S12 +3
cf
β⊤. Combining (a) and (b), we
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find that EA interprets S12 +3β⊤. But this contradicts the Second Incompleteness
Theorem.
We note that our last two examples also satisfy the Hilbert-Bernays Condition.
A disadvantage of these examples is do not work for the global version of the Lo¨b
Conditions, where the quantifiers over sentences for L2 and L3 are inside the theory.
It would be interesting to have an example for this case.
Example A.3. +−+: Here is an example of a Fefermanian predicate that does
satisfy the Lo¨b Conditions and does not satisfy the Kreisel Condition. Let U0 := EA,
U := EA+2β⊥. Let P := provγ , where γ(x) :↔ β(x) ∨ x = p2β⊥q.
We have U ⊢ 2γ⊥, but U 0 ⊥, so the Kreisel condition fails for P and U .
We note that our example also works for U0 := U := EA+2β⊥.
We provide a second example, where the base and the lead theories are sound. By
Theorem 3.7, the predicate that represents the axioms cannot be Σ01.
We take U0 := U := EA. We define: δ(x) :↔ β(x) ∨ (3β⊤ ∧ x = p⊥q). We note
that δ numerates {B} in EA, where B is the single axiom for EA. We find:
EA ⊢ 2δ⊥ ↔ (2β⊥ ∧ 2β⊥) ∨ (3β⊤ ∧ 2β(⊥ → ⊥))
↔ ⊤
So EA ⊢ 2δ⊥. It follows that provδ is not Kreiselian and satisfies the Feferman
Conditions and the Lo¨b Conditions.
We note that provδ is Σ
0
2.
Example A.4. +−−: Let U0 := U := EA and let P be x = x. Clearly, P satisfies
the Lo¨b conditions in EA, but P is not Kreiselian. Since EA is sound and P is Σ01,
a Fefermanian P must be Kreiselian. So, P is also not Fefermanian.
Example A.5. −++: The case of Fefermanian predicates that do not satisfy
the Lo¨b Conditions is among the most interesting of our cases. The study of the
possibilities for such predicates for the case of extensions of Peano Arithmetic has
been taken up by Taishi Kurahashi in great depth. See [Kur17] and [Kur18].
A classical example of such a predicate is Feferman Provability. We write πx for
a standard arithmetization of the set of y ≤ x that are codes of single axioms of
the theories IΣz. We define π
⋆(y) :↔ ∃x (πx(y) ∧ 3πx⊤). Let P := provπ⋆ . This
predicate was introduced by Solomon Feferman in his classical paper [Fef60]. By
the essential reflexivity of PA, one finds that 2π⋆ is Fefermanian for PA over PA.
For closely related reasons 2⋆ is Kreiselian. However, 2⋆ does not satisfy the Lo¨b
Conditions. The bimodal provability logic of 2π and 2π⋆ has been characterized
by Volodya Shavrukov in [Sha94]. For some further work, see [Mon78] and [Vis89].
We note that 2π⋆ is Σ
0
2.
An example of quite different flavor uses the fact that EA does not verify Σ01-
collection. We refer the reader to [Vis17, Subsection 6.2]. This example provides a
Σ01-axiomatization σ. As a consequence provσ is Σ
0
1,1. We refer the reader to e.g.
[Vis14] for a further explanation of the relevant formula hierarchy.
Example A.6. −+−: Here is an example of a P that satisfies the Kreisel Condition
but not the Lo¨b Conditions and the Feferman Condition. Let U0 := U := EA. Let
P (x) := (provπ(x) ∧ x 6= p⊥q).
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We note that L2 fails for P over EA. This shows that P does not satisfy the Lo¨b
Conditions and cannot be Fefermanian.
Example A.7. −−+: The examples are adaptations of the predicates and theories
in Example A.5. We just add something to make the examples non-Kreiselian. We
use the notations of Example A.5.
We give our first example of a non-Kreiselian Fefermanian predicate that does
not satisfy the Lo¨b Conditions. Let U0 := U := PA. We take:
π◦(x) :↔ π⋆(x) ∨ (3π⊤ ∧ x = p2π⊥q).
Let P := provπ◦ .
It is easily seen that π◦ numerates the axioms of PA in PA. We have, using the
fact that we have HB for 2π⋆ :
PA ⊢ 2π◦2π⊥ ↔ (2π⊥ ∧ 2π⋆2π⊥) ∨ (3π⊤ ∧ 2π⋆(2π⊥ → 2π⊥))
↔ 2π⊥ ∨3π⊤
↔ ⊤
It follows that PA ⊢ 2π◦2π⊥. However, PA 0 2π⊥, so provπ◦ is not Kreiselian. We
have:
PA ⊢ 2π◦⊥ ↔ (2π⊥ ∧ 2π⋆⊥) ∨ (3π⊤ ∧ 2π⋆¬2π⊥)
↔ (2π⊥ ∧ ⊥) ∨ (3π⊤ ∧ 2π¬2π⊥)
↔ 3π⊤ ∧ 2π⊥
↔ ⊥
So PA ⊢ ¬2π◦⊥. Thus, 2π◦ cannot satisfy the Lo¨b Conditions.
Finally, 2◦ is clearly Σ02.
Here is our second example. The presentation of our example presupposes that the
reader has [Vis17, Subsection 6.2] at hand. We take U0 := EA, U := EA+2β2π⊥.
We define σ◦(x) :↔ σ(x) ∨ x = p2β2π⊥q. Clearly, σ
◦ numerates the axioms of U
in EA. We take P (x) := provσ◦(x). Evidently, P is Fefermanian for EA + 2β2π⊥
over EA.
Since, we have EA ⊢ 2βC → 2σC and EA ⊢ 2σC → 2σ◦C. We find U ⊢
2U2π⊥. Suppose we would have U ⊢ 2π⊥. In would follow that EA + 2β2π⊥ ⊢
2π⊥, and, hence, EA ⊢ 2π⊥. Quod non. Thus U 0 2π⊥. So, P is not Kreiselian.
We note that over U we have, by Σ01-completeness, that 2σ and 2σ◦ coincide
also in iterated 2σ-contexts. Suppose 2σ◦ satisfies the Lo¨b Conditions over U . It
follows that 2σ also satisfies the Lo¨b Conditions over U . So, a fortiori, we find
U ⊢ 2σ3σ⊤ → 2σ⊥. By Lemma 6.11 and Lemma 6.12 of [Vis17, Subsection 6.2],
we find:
EA+2β2π⊥ ⊢ (S
⋆ ∨ 2β⊥)→ ((S
⋆ ∧ 2β2β⊥) ∨ 2β⊥).
It follows that EA + 2π⊥ + S
⋆ ⊢ 2β2β⊥. However, we can construct a model of
EA+2π⊥+ S
⋆ + ¬2β2β⊥ using the construction described in [Vis17, Subsection
6.2].
Example A.8. −−−: We take U0 := U := EA and P (x) := ⊥. It is clear that P
does not satisfy the Lo¨b Conditions. Nor is it Kreiselian or Fefermanian.
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